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CURRENT CASE

ANIMAL PATENTS: MAN-MADE LIFE FORMS AS PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER, Ex parteAllen, 2 U.S.P.Q. 1425
(Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1987).
The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences in Ex ParteAllen (hereinafter Allen) ruled that manmade life forms may be statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 and eligible for patent protection.' In reaching this decision,
an Examiner-in-Chief thoroughly discussed the Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the applicability of
that interpretation to the present case.2
In Allen, appellants were the developers of a polyploid3 oyster.
The patent examiner in Allen allowed claims 1 through 7 and 9
through 11, which were drawn to a method of inducing polyploidy
in oysters utilyzing hydrostatic pressure. The patent examiner rejected claims 8 and 12 through 14, which were product-by-process
claims, dependent on the allowed claims, for producing a species of
Pacific oysters, Crassostreagigas. The claims were rejected for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in view of an article appearing in the
Aquaculturejournal,4 and on the ground that the claimed invention
did not fall within the statutory subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Board upheld the patent examiner's Section 101 rejection
in view of the prior art. Stanley discloses a method of inducing
polyploidy in oysters by treating fertilized eggs with cytochalasin B.
Although appellants utilized hydrostatic pressure rather than chemical treatment to induce polyploidy in the oysters, the Board ruled
that the patentability of a product did not depend solely on the
method of production: "If the product in a product-by-process
1. The language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 is as follows:
§ 101. Inventions patentable. Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
2. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 65 L. Ed. 2d 144, 100 S.Ct. 2204 (1980).
3. Polyploid: Having more than twice the normal number of chromosomes. FUNK &
WAGNALLS STANDARD DICTIONARY 616 (Ist ed. 1980).
4. Stanley, Growth of American Oysters Increased by Polyploidy Induced by Blocking
Meiosis I But Not Meiosis II, 37 AQUACULTURE, 147-55 (1984).
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claim is the same as or obvious from a product of prior art, the
claim is unpatentable even though the latter product was made by a
different process." 5
In support of his 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection, the patent examiner stated that polyploid oysters are living entities which do not fall
within the statutory framework of 35 U.S.C. § 101. In addition, the
patent examiner stated that an animal produced by the claimed
method would be controlled by laws of nature and would not be a
patentable manufacture by man. However the Board noted that the
patent examiner presented no evidence that the claimed polyploid
oyster occurred naturally without man's intervention. Thus, the examiner was left to rely on his position that certain living entities
were not within the terms of 35 U.S.C. § 101 in accordance with In
re Merat6 and In re Bergy, Coats and Malik.7
The decision in Merat, a case involving chicken breeding, did
not reach the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection made by the patent examiner and the Board in that case. Merat was discounted in the present action. The decision in Bergy, in finding a claimed
microorganism to be within the terms "manufacture" and "composition of matter" of 35 U.S.C. § 101, appeared to draw a distinction
between the claimed microorganisms and other living entities.
Although the court in Bergy went on to determine that microorganisms could be patentable, it made it clear that it was only deciding
the case before it and was not deciding whether living entities in
general were within the scope of § 101.
Both decisions demonstrate that courts have been slow to demarcate the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101 with regard to living organisms. An explanation for this hesitancy possibly stems from the
confusion created by biological scientists who have a tendency to
think of plants and animals as distinct groups, with microorganisms
(bacteria, fungi, protozoa, etc.) as a third group having some characteristics of both. An example of the confusion that such a line of
thinking has created is evidenced in the majority opinion in Bergy,
which states that "the nature ... of microorganisms like the one
defined in claim 5 are more akin to inanimate chemical compositions such as reactants, reagents, and catalysts than they are to horses and honeybees or raspberries and roses." 8
In contrast, the dissent in Bergy points out that:
5.
6.
7.
8.

In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 227 U.S.P.Q. 964 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
In re Merat, 519 F.2d 1390, (C.C.P.A. 1975).
In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 195 U.S.P.Q. 344 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
195 U.S.P.Q. 350.

1988]

C4SENOTE

Such a distinction is purely gratuitous and clearly erroneous.
The nature of organisms, whether microorganisms, plants, or
other living things, is fundamentally different from that of inanimate chemical compositions.9
The dissent in Bergy further argued that Congress established the
Plant Patent Act because Congress did not intend 35 U.S.C. § 101
to be extended to living entities and that if living entities were to be
protectable by patent it would require similar Congressional action,
not interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Board inAllen contends that the Supreme Court's decision
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty resolves any debate on the scope of
§ 101. In that case the court noted that the use of the expansive
terms "manufacture" and "composition of matter" modified by the
comprehensive term "any" indicated that Congress "plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope." The
Supreme Court also noted that the legislative history of § 101 supports a broad construction and concluded from the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act that Congress intended statutory
subject matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by
man."
The Board in Allen went on to state that whether or not the
claims are drawn to a living entity is not controlling on the question
of whether the claims are drawn to patentable subject matter under
§ 101. Thus, Allen is significant for its clarification of the Patent
Office's stance regarding animal patents. As a guide for the future,
the Board in Allen sees the issue in determining whether claimed
subject matter is patentable under § 101 as "simply whether that
subject matter is made by man. If the claimed subject matter occurs
naturally, it is not patentable subject matter under § 101." 10
Following the decision in this case, the United States Senate on
May 28, 1987, voted to bar the Patent Office from expending funds
during the fiscal year 1987 for the purpose of granting patents on
animals changed through engineering technology.11 Hearings on
animal patents have continued, including a House hearing on November 12, 1987. Typically, the Patent Office is behind the times in
providing patent protection for new technology, resulting in Congressional action, such as the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act,
to fill the gap in protection left open by the Patent Office. With
9. Id. at 352.
10. Ex Parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1985).
11. The Senate's action came in the form of an amendment to supplemental appropriations legislation (H.R. 1827).
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regard to providing protection to living entities, the roles typically
assumed by the Patent Office and Congress appear to have reversed.
Whether the Patent Office's progressive attitude will continue upon
the close of the fiscal year 1987 remains to be seen. Clearly, if
everything under the sun that is made by man is patentable, Congressional action will be required to limit the scope of § 101 in the
future.
Joan Gates

